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Commentary on Emerson v. Magendantz
lucinda m. ﬁnley

introduction
The desire to control fertility and childbearing has long been a human
imperative. Recognizing how fundamentally the “decision whether to bear
or beget a child” can affect one’s life, in the early 1970s the US Supreme
Court gave constitutional protection to this decision in landmark cases involv
ing access to contraception and abortion.1 Even before constitutional law
recognized a woman’s right to control her reproductive destiny, courts
grappled with repercussions of medical negligence that impinged on this
right. These cases fall into two distinct categories: cases involving women
who did not want any children or additional children, and cases involving
women who wanted children free from congenital disease or disability.2 These
cases typically present medical malpractice claims involving the failure prop
erly to perform a tubal ligation or vasectomy,3 or failure to inform a parent of
the likelihood a pregnancy would result in a child with birth defects or a
genetic disease, thereby depriving a woman of her right to make an informed
decision about whether to conceive, or if already pregnant, to have an
abortion.4

1
2

3

4

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See Barbara Pfeiffer Billauer, The Sperminator as a Public Nuisance: Redressing Wrongful Life
Claims in New Ways (Aka New Tricks for Old Torts), 42 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 1 (2019).
See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) (failed sterilization procedure led to
unwanted pregnancy and childbirth); Christensen v. Thornby, 255 N.W. 620 (Minn. 1934)
(husband’s failed vasectomy led to wife’s unwanted pregnancy that threatened her health).
Many of the earliest cases in this category arose from the rubella epidemic and involved claims
that a doctor negligently failed to inform the pregnant woman of the risks of having a disabled
child due to German measles exposure. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689
(N.J. 1967); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975). Some states have statutorily banned
wrongful birth actions that involve a claim that but for a physician’s negligence a woman
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Along the way, courts have used various names to identify these claims. The
terminology, and judicial receptivity to the claims, varies according to whether
the plaintiff is the child born with a disabling condition, or the parents who
wanted to avoid having a child. When the claim is brought on behalf of a
child who never would have been conceived, or would have been aborted, but
for the defendant’s negligence, courts have called the claim “wrongful life.”
All but a few states reject such claims, reasoning that “[w]hether it is better
never to have been born at all than to have been born with even gross
deﬁciencies is a mystery more properly to be left to the philosophers and the
theologians.”5 In contrast, when the claim is brought by parents for damages
resulting from an unwanted pregnancy and subsequent birth, courts com
monly use the term “wrongful birth,”6 and these claims are widely allowed.
Some courts further reﬁne the terminology, using the terms “wrongful con
ception” or “wrongful pregnancy” for those cases where a failed sterilization
procedure results in the birth of a healthy child.7

the measure of damages
While courts have overwhelmingly approved claims for wrongful birth, wrong
ful pregnancy, or wrongful conception, determining the measure of damages
has been fraught with contention. Only one state high court has denied
recovery outright, reasoning that the birth of a healthy child presents no
compensable injury.8 All the other state courts to have addressed these claims
do recognize that there is some injury from an unwanted pregnancy, but the
majority of courts allow only limited recovery, which generally includes the
costs of the initial failed sterilization procedure and of the subsequent correct
ive procedure, medical expenses for prenatal care and the childbirth and

5

6
7

8

would have chosen to abort. See Cailin Harris, Statutory Prohibitions on Wrongful Birth
Claims and Their Dangerous Effects on Parents, 34 B.C.J. L. & Soc. Just. 365 (2014).
Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978). Only California, Washington, and New
Jersey permit “wrongful life” claims by the disabled child. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs.,
165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980); Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis,
Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 495 (Wash. 1983). See generally Barbara Pfeiffer Billauer, “Wrongful Life” in
the Age of Crispr-Cas, 142 Penn State L. Rev. (2020).
Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981).
See James v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 879 (W. Va. 1985); Chaffee v. Seslar, 786 N.E.2d
705 (Ind. 2003).
Szekeres v. Robinson, 715 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Nev. 1986).
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immediate postpartum care.9 Some courts also allow damages for emotional
distress10 and lost wages related to the pregnancy.11
The major disagreement involves the cost of raising the healthy child. Only
two state courts allow full recovery for child rearing costs. Courts denying full
recovery raise public policy arguments such as resistance to categorizing a
healthy child as a harm,12 or allege difﬁculty in valuing these claims.13 The
most common rationale that courts give for denying full recovery for the costs
of rearing a healthy child is based on what has been called the beneﬁt offset
rule. This rule, derived from Restatement (Second) Torts §920, provides that
the costs of rearing a healthy child should be offset by the beneﬁts, either
emotional or economic, that the child brings to the parents’ lives.
The case of Emerson v. Magendantz14 presents a classic wrongful pregnancy
fact pattern of a failed sterilization operation, and sets forth the issue of the
appropriate measure of damages in stark relief. This makes it an excellent
vehicle to investigate the romanticized stereotypes about children, rooted in
ideology that presumes the centrality and unmitigated joy of motherhood in
women’s lives, that permeate the reasoning of courts that bar full recovery. By
the time Emerson was decided in 1997, thirty six US jurisdictions had
approved the validity of wrongful birth claims, including wrongful conception
and pregnancy. In Rhode Island, however, the matter was still one of ﬁrst
impression, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court extensively surveyed the
various approaches taken by other courts.

EMERSON V. MAGENDANTZ

Diane and Thomas Emerson already had one child and determined they
could not afford another when Emerson sought a tubal ligation from
obstetrician gynecologist Dr. Henry Magendantz. The operation was a failure,
and a year later Emerson gave birth to a daughter, Kirsten, born with congeni
tal deformities. After the birth, Emerson underwent a second tubal ligation.
She and her husband later brought suit, claiming that she suffered severe
physical pain and emotional distress, required additional invasive medical
treatment and sustained lost wages and diminished earning capacity.

9
10
11
12
13
14

See, e.g., James, 332 S.E.2d at 879.
See, e.g., Speck, 439 A.2d 110.
See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 343 S.E.2d 301, 305 (Va. 1986).
See, e.g., Johnson v. Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland, 540 N.E.2d 1370, 1378 (Ohio 1989).
See, e.g., McKernan v. Aasheim, 687 P.2d 850, 855 (Wash. 1984).
689 A.2d 409 (R.I. 1997).
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Additionally, the Emersons sought recompense for their existing and future
obligations to ﬁnancially care for their daughter.
Defendant Magendantz moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that
Rhode Island law should not recognize a tort claim for a failed sterilization
procedure because the resulting child was a “precious gift.” The trial court,
seeking deﬁnitive guidance on the legal issues at the heart of the motion to
dismiss, certiﬁed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court the questions of whether
this tort claim should be allowed, and, if so, what damages should be awarded.
After an extensive review of existing precedent, the Supreme Court, following
the majority of American jurisdictions, held that a cause of action existed for
negligent performance of sterilization when a patient subsequently becomes
pregnant and delivers a child. The court, however, offered no independent
analysis of the reasons for allowing the claim or of the nature of the interests
harmed.
The court then turned its attention to the measure of damages, noting the
three different types of remedies that other courts had allowed: limited recov
ery consisting of the expenses of and pain and suffering from pregnancy and
delivery and the subsequent sterilization; full recovery for all foreseeable
damages including the costs of child rearing; and full recovery but with the
costs of child rearing offset by the beneﬁts derived by the parents from having a
healthy child.
Faced with these alternatives regarding the damage claim, by a 3:2 vote the
court rejected both full recovery including child rearing costs for a healthy
child, and the beneﬁt offset approach, and instead adopted the limited recov
ery rule, albeit a variant which excludes the mother’s emotional distress
incident to the pregnancy. In support of their decision, the Emerson majority
reasoned that “the public policy of this state would preclude the granting of
rearing costs for a healthy child whose parents . . . have decided to retain the
child as their own with all the joys and beneﬁts that are derived from
parenthood.”15 The fact that the parents decided to keep the child rather than
pursue abortion or adoption “constitutes most persuasive evidence that the
parents consider the beneﬁt of retaining the child to outweigh the economic
costs of child rearing.”16
If the child, such as Kirsten Emerson, was born with congenital defects, the
Emerson majority decided that the parents could recover the extraordinary
costs of raising a disabled child that exceeded the costs associated with rearing
a nondisabled child. The majority further expanded the allowable damages for
15
16

689 A.2d at 413.
Id.
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a disabled child when the physician had reason to know that there was a
likelihood that any pregnancy resulting from a failed sterilization could result
in a physically or mentally handicapped child. In these circumstances which
did not apply to the Emersons − the parents would be able to recover all of the
costs of raising the child throughout its life, offset only by any governmental
beneﬁts received, plus emotional distress from the disability.17
Two justices, while concurring with the decision to recognize the wrongful
pregnancy cause of action, dissented from the limitation on recoverable
damages. The dissenters noted that the case was a straightforward medical
malpractice action, and thus should be treated in accordance with the normal
tort principle that all foreseeable damages are recoverable and the costs of
raising a child that results from a failed sterilization are certainly foreseeable.
The dissent chastised the majority’s treatment of parents’ decision to keep a
child rather than choose adoption or abortion as evidence that the parents
considered the child a beneﬁt. Such an equation, the dissent argued, amounts
to a denial of a woman’s constitutionally protected right to not have children.18
The dissent stopped short, however, of permitting full recovery including all
child rearing costs, in all situations. They recommended following the deci
sions of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Burke v. Rivo,19 and
the Connecticut Supreme Court in Ochs v. Borrelli,20 which denied recovery
for child rearing costs when the reason the parents sought sterilization was to
prevent birth defects or a health risk to the mother, and the resulting preg
nancy and child were healthy. In this instance, these courts and the Emerson
dissenters reasoned, the harm the parents sought to prevent had in fact not
happened, so for them the healthy child could not be considered a foreseeable
and compensable injury.

the feminist judgment
Professor Katharine Silbaugh, writing as Justice Silbaugh, offers a rewritten
majority opinion that in signiﬁcant aspects tracks the reasoning of the Emerson
dissent in adopting the rule of full recovery for all foreseeable damages,
including child rearing costs for a healthy child. But Silbaugh also signiﬁ
cantly departs from the dissent, criticizing the Burke and Ochs decisions on
17
18

19
20

Id. at 414.
Id. at 416 (Bourcier, J., dissenting). The dissent cited Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1975); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), as
establishing the right to decide to not have children.
551 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1990).
445 A.2d 883 (Conn. 1982).
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which it relies as inviting an inquiry into a woman’s reasons for wanting to
avoid pregnancy that inherently undermines the autonomy of her choice, and
risks basing recovery on paternalistic value judgments about her reasons for
not wanting a child. Silbaugh’s opinion is distinctly feminist in two signiﬁcant
ways: (1) she relies on liberal feminist theory to assert women’s reproductive
autonomy and choice21 not to become a parent as a paramount value that is
not only constitutionally protected, but should also be fully protected by tort
law; and (2) she focuses on women’s experiences, needs, and perspectives as
the relevant lens for legal policy, rather than romanticized stereotypes
divorced from reality about the costless joys of children.
In contrast with the Emerson majority, which simply concluded that it
would recognize a cause of action because the overwhelming majority of
other courts have allowed this claim, Justice Silbaugh analyzes the reasons
why unwanted pregnancy, even when it results in a healthy child, should be
considered a compensable harm. She notes that US constitutional law pro
tects the right to decide not to become a parent not only because of abstract
interests in autonomy, but also because of the recognition that pregnancy, and
the mental, physical, and ﬁnancial strains of child rearing, can in fact harm
women’s physical health and economic prospects and ability to participate
equally in society.
As Silbaugh points out, the joys of pregnancy and child rearing blithely
assumed by the Emerson majority are not unmitigated. Childbearing can lead
to economic loss from child rearing costs and diminished career opportun
ities, and also can be accompanied by physical harm and mental anguish.
Silbaugh draws on the everyday lived experiences of women, for whom it is
normal to go to great lengths to avoid pregnancy and its sequelae (i.e. having a
child), as proof enough of its non benign status. She deftly uses this aspect of
women’s experience to eviscerate defendant Magendantz’s argument that
having a child can never be a harm because children invariably bring precious
joy. The efforts of the vast majority of women routinely to attempt to avoid
pregnancy for most of their fertile years demonstrates that women do not see
pregnancy and child rearing as a precious joy that outweighs all its burdens.
Silbaugh’s focus on the compensable injury as the impairment of repro
ductive autonomy is signiﬁcant, because it keeps the focus on the interests of
the plaintiff who wanted to not have a child, and avoids the conundrum that
has tripped up judges of whether a healthy child should be considered an
21

See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory 19–26 (3d
ed. 2013) (describing liberal feminist legal theory and its focus on women’s autonomy and
reproductive choice).
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“injury.” Under Silbaugh’s analysis, when a woman wants to avoid having a
child for any reason, and seeks sterilization to prevent this outcome, the costs
of rearing the child that results from the failed sterilization are foreseeable
consequences of the physician’s negligence toward the woman, regardless of
whether the child is healthy or disabled.
Silbaugh’s emphasis on women’s reproductive autonomy and the experien
tial burdens of pregnancy and child rearing brings into sharp relief the ways in
which the majority approach denies women the full range of compensation to
which they would otherwise be entitled by traditional tort law principles
routinely applied in contexts other than pregnancy. In discussing why the
so called beneﬁt offset rule should be rejected, Silbaugh notes that conven
tional negligence law bars the use of a beneﬁt to one type of human interest to
mitigate damages from harm to a different type of interest, as in using
emotional beneﬁt to offset economic harm. As she trenchantly points out,
even when a child does bring great emotional beneﬁt to parents, they cannot
take these beneﬁts to the bank. That so many courts have misapplied this
general rule in pregnancy related cases is but another example of the law’s
difﬁculty in addressing the complex reality of pregnancy to women’s lives,
blinded perhaps by a moralistic preference for child bearing.
Silbaugh’s analysis suggests that the real motivating public policy that leads
courts to limit recovery seems to be the notion that women are meant to be
mothers, and that a woman’s desire to avoid childbearing is inevitably mis
guided in retrospect, because she has failed to embrace the joy. As Silbaugh
points out, the ideology underlying the cases that deny full recovery is that
doctors who fail to sterilize a woman have actually done both that woman and
society a favor. The burdens of children on women become invisible, and the
logic of women’s reproductive choice not to become a mother becomes, as
she puts it, “idiosyncratic or selﬁsh.”
Silbaugh’s feminist embrace of women’s autonomy and respect for their
reproductive choices also is apparent when she rejects the damages limitation
endorsed by the dissenters in Emerson. The dissenters embraced full recovery
for child rearing costs only when the reason a woman wanted to avoid
pregnancy was to avoid the economic burden of a child. But they rejected
full recovery when the reason a woman wanted to be sterilized was to avoid a
disabled child or adverse health effects of pregnancy, and she survived the
pregnancy and had a nondisabled child. Silbaugh refuses to inquire into the
motivations for pregnancy prevention and declines to stigmatize some
choices. She expresses concern that once one starts down the slippery slope
of privileging some reasons for wanting to avoid pregnancy over others,
moralistic judgment can inevitably creep into the legal calculation. Her

Emerson v. Magendantz

298

position is far more consistent with valuing autonomy, and it also recognizes
that even when the wish to avoid pregnancy is based on one set of reasons that
do not materialize, there can still be an adverse impact of even a healthy child
on a woman’s economic and social well being
Silbaugh’s rewritten opinion draws on this complex reality of mothering
when she exposes the “sentimentality” of the actual opinion’s view of the
“beneﬁt” of child rearing, imposed at the expense of the mother who may
experience it in an entirely different fashion. The original decision assumes
that a woman’s decision not to abort or put the child up for adoption is
persuasive proof that she considers the child a joyful beneﬁt, completely
without any economic or emotional burden on her life. By imposing the
Hobson’s choice of receiving no compensation for the costs of rearing a
healthy child from the negligent physician, or aborting the pregnancy or
putting the child up for adoption − choices that may go against personal
morality − the original Emerson opinion was completely divorced from any
experiential idea of what pregnancy and mothering involves.
Silbaugh also recognizes the complex reality of mothering when she criti
cizes cases, such as the actual Emerson majority, and the Florida decision of
Fassoulas v. Ramey22 on which it relied, that deny damages for healthy
children but permit damages for the extraordinary costs of raising a child with
disabilities. Silbaugh points out that the assumption that a child with disabil
ities invariably presents burdens that outweigh any beneﬁts is a “breathtaking
double insult,” both to parents who derive great joy from their children with
disabilities, and to parents like the Emersons who had good reasons for
determining that even a healthy child would present too great a burden in
their lives.

going further and implications
If Silbaugh’s reasoning that women’s reproductive autonomy and lived experi
ences matter more than romanticized stereotypes about mothering had been
adopted by a state’s highest court in 1997, it could have inﬂuenced subsequent
courts to align recovery in wrongful birth cases with traditional tort principles
of full recovery for all damages caused by the negligence. Her articulation of
why childbearing can adversely impact women’s lives, even when they deeply
love and value their children, has been fully borne out by subsequent socio
logical research. It is now fully empirically established that the emotional and
22

450 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1984).
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economic burdens of child rearing affect women differently than men.
Women bear a larger share of the child rearing responsibilities.23 Women also
experience diminished earnings when they become mothers, while men tend
to experience increased income when they become fathers.24 This mother
hood wage penalty is most pronounced in low wage jobs, which exacerbates
overall gender inequality in wages for the women who can least afford it.25
With the groundwork laid by Silbaugh, this research could lead even more
courts to understand why permitting recovery of all the costs of rearing the
child that results from a negligently performed sterilization is essential to
redressing the harm and advancing women’s equality.
In addition to discussing the burdens of child rearing on women, Silbaugh
could have gone further by more explicitly considering the signiﬁcant rela
tional aspects of motherhood on other family members. This concept is
evidenced by concerns Emerson may have had regarding the impact of
Kirsten’s birth on her already existing child. Whatever family resources exist
will now have to be split between the children, as will the parents’ time and
attention. These are consequences that Emerson went to great lengths to
avoid, and they could be alleviated by the full recovery for child rearing costs
adopted in Silbaugh’s feminist rewritten opinion.
Silbaugh’s forceful advocacy for the full recovery principle also could have
inﬂuenced courts in other countries, which, like the majority in Emerson,
make concerted efforts to review preexisting cases in order to choose what
degree of damages to allow. Prior to Emerson, in the United Kingdom, the
prevailing view was that the normal tort principle of recovery for all foresee
able loss applied, and thus child rearing costs were fully compensable. By
1999 the sentiment in the UK had changed, inﬂuenced by the accumulating
weight of US authority as exempliﬁed by Emerson. In 1999, the House of
Lords, at that time the supreme appellate court that declared binding law for
all civil cases in the UK, ruled in Macfarlane and Another v. Tayside Health
Board (Scot.),26 that compensation for child rearing costs and diminished
post birth income would no longer be recoverable. This was a case where a

23

24

25

26

Jill E. Yavorsky, Claire M. Kamp Dush, & Sarah J. Schoppe-Sullivan, Production of Inequality:
Gender Division of Labor across the Transition to Parenthood, 77 J. Marriage & Fam. 662, 663
(2015).
Michelle J. Budig & Paula England, The Wage Penalty for Motherhood, 66 Am. Soc. Rev. 204
(2001).
Michelle J. Budig, The Fatherhood Bonus and the Motherhood Penalty: Parenthood and the
Gender Gap in Pay, Third Way (Sept. 2, 2014) https://www.thirdway.org/report/the-fatherhoodbonus-and-the-motherhood-penalty-parenthood-and-the-gender-gap-in-pay
[2000] 2 AC 59 (HL) (appeal taken from Scot.).
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vasectomy performed on the husband failed, and the wife became pregnant
and bore a ﬁfth child that the couple alleged they could not afford. Since the
MacFarlane court surveyed the American cases, one wonders what would
have happened to law on the international scene if Emerson had been decided
by the feminist Justice Silbaugh? Would it have turned the entire tide of
British cases post MacFarlane on its head?27 If so, that in turn might have
inﬂuenced courts in the United States to stop insulating negligent defendants
from the full costs and effects of malpractice when it comes to pregnancy
generating harms.
The feminist voice of Justice Silbaugh, focusing on how women actually
are affected by unwanted pregnancy and child rearing, and valuing women’s
reproductive autonomy, could have changed the tide depriving women of
their due, and shielding a defendant from foreseeable acts of malpractice. The
rewritten feminist opinion reminds us that to accomplish this end, a diversity
of judicial voices inﬂuenced by feminist theory certainly counts.

EMERSON v. MAGENDANTZ, 689 A.2D 409
(R.I. 1997)

justice katharine b. silbaugh delivered
the opinion for the court
On April 27, 1995, Justice Ragosta of the superior court certiﬁed two questions
of law to this court pursuant to R.I. G.L. § 9 24 27:
1. Is there a cause of action under Rhode Island law when a physician
negligently performs a sterilization procedure and the patient subse
quently becomes pregnant and delivers a child?
2. If so, what is the measure of damages?
The facts giving rise to these certiﬁed questions may be summarized as
follows from the pleadings and the documents ﬁled by the parties in the
superior court and in this court.
Following the birth of her ﬁrst child, plaintiff Diane Emerson made a
decision not to have more children and sought medical intervention to
prevent any future conceptions. Emerson was motivated by a desire to avoid
the expenses associated with supporting a larger family. She chose to undergo
27

In 2003 Australia reversed the trend back when the court in Cattanach v. Melchior, (2003)
215 CLR 1 (Austl.), held the negligent doctor could be held responsible for the costs of raising
and maintaining a healthy child.
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a tubal ligation surgical procedure performed by defendant Henry
Magendantz, MD, a gynecologist who advised Emerson about her steriliza
tion options. Magendantz failed to advise Emerson about the risks of failure
from a tubal ligation at any time before or after surgery.
A few months after her sterilization surgery, Emerson discovered that she
was pregnant, despite her tubal ligation. She gave birth to Kirsten Emerson in
early 1992, after which she chose to undergo a second tubal ligation surgery.
Emerson and her husband ﬁled a complaint against Magendantz alleging that
his negligence both in performing the procedure and in failing to inform
Emerson of any postsurgical risk of becoming pregnant led to signiﬁcant
damage to each of them. Emerson alleged that she suffered severe pain from
pregnancy and childbirth as well as from additional invasive medical treat
ment pursuant to both the pregnancy and the second tubal ligation. In
addition, both Emersons alleged that they have suffered mental anguish and
distress arising from the unwanted pregnancy, as well as lost wages and earning
capacity associated with both the pregnancy and the additional child rearing
burdens of a second child. Finally, the complaint alleges that Magendantz’s
negligence has imposed on the Emersons an obligation to expend substantial
resources for the medical care and child rearing expenses of Kirsten, who has
already required substantial resources due to severe congenital health issues.
Magendantz moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that there is no
cognizable claim for wrongful pregnancy under Rhode Island law, and in
response to that motion, Justice Ragosta certiﬁed the two questions to us.

i is there a cause of action under rhode island law
when a physician negligently performs a sterilization
procedure and the patient subsequently becomes
pregnant and delivers a child?
The question posed is an issue of ﬁrst impression in this state. Of the
numerous courts that have considered the question, however, all but one
recognize a cause of action for negligent performance of sterilization proced
ures whether performed on a woman or on a man.1
The thirty ﬁve other states that have allowed the claim vary widely, how
ever, in their treatment of the appropriate measure of damages. While the near
unanimity of courts that recognize the claim might lead us to provide a
cursory afﬁrmative answer to the ﬁrst certiﬁed issue, the relationship between
1

The lone case to deny a cause of action for negligent performance of sterilization procedures is
Szekeres v. Robinson, 715 P.2d 1076 (Nev. 1986).
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the ﬁrst and the second issue is too tightly woven to allow us this cursory
answer. We conclude that an examination of the reasoning for and against a
cause of action is essential to understanding the contours of the wrong, which
in turn informs the appropriate measure of damages.
Defendant Magendantz argues in his brief that Rhode Island should decline
to recognize a cause of action in these situations because viewing the birth of a
child as a legally compensable injury is “offensive to the public sentiment that
the birth of a child is one of life’s most precious gifts.” Yet according to this logic,
Magendantz has taken it as his professional medical calling voluntarily to
perform elective sterilization procedures that have as their sole purpose depriv
ing adults of, in his own words, “one of life’s most precious gifts.” We cannot
comprehend why Magendantz would offer sterilization services if he believed
his own argument, and we consider his routine medical practice evidence that
he does not. Further, extending the logic of his argument, were Magendantz to
fail each time he contracted to perform a sterilization procedure, his medical
ineptitude would actually have bestowed a precious beneﬁt on his poorly served
patients. Indeed, one Pennsylvania court that denied a cause of action in
contract for these cases offered just such a rationale: “To allow damages in a
suit such as this would mean that the physician would have to pay for the fun,
joy, and affection which plaintiff[] will have in the rearing and education of
[their] ﬁfth child.” Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D & C. 2d 41, 45 46 (1957). This
reasoning seems to cast a woman’s desire to avoid prospective parentage as
always misguided retrospectively.
But the law ﬁrmly respects and protects a woman’s autonomous decision
not to have children, and recognizes that interference with this decision
undoubtedly can lead to harm. In 1965, the United States Supreme Court
recognized that a married couple’s decision to prevent conception during
sexual relations is a constitutionally protected right. Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965). The court did not explore in depth the reasons that a
couple would decide against procreation, defending instead a privacy of
decision making in doing so. Yet it is difﬁcult to see how the prevention of
pregnancy can be a coherent decision worthy of constitutional protection if it
were not possible for pregnancy especially an unwanted one − to be a harm.
Indeed, in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the court articulated the harm a
pregnancy can impose on a woman who does not wish to bear a child, and
that reasoning bears repeating in response to defendant Magendantz’s argu
ment that “the birth of a child is one of life’s most precious gifts”:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by
denying this choice altogether is apparent. Speciﬁc and direct harm
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medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or
additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future.
Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be
taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with
the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family
already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it.
Id. at 153

When the Supreme Court later conﬁrmed the basic holding of Roe in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), it again
connected women’s economic and social well being to reproductive control,
conﬁrming that the “ability of women to participate equally in the economic
and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their
reproductive lives.” Id. at 836. Applying this insight, Emerson’s decision to
prevent conception through sterilization could understandably be made to
enhance her economic and social prospects, and so the pregnancy in question
can inﬂict damages to those interests. Limiting future reproduction is an
essential component of autonomy and liberty for women. Interfering with it
through medical negligence therefore logically inﬂicts a grave harm.
The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade carefully evaluated a balancing of
interests, including women’s right to control their own reproductive lives and
the state’s interest in protecting potential life, then conﬁrmed that balancing
more recently in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Given these decisions, it
would be remarkable were this court to accept Magendantz’s argument that
bearing a child that a woman had undergone surgery to prevent placed only
blessings, and no countervailing burdens, on that woman. Magendantz’s
contention that it would offend public policy to recognize a cause of action
precisely because it would “declare that a birth is a legally compensable
injury,” ﬂies in the face of the very reasons articulated in Roe for protecting
a woman’s reproductive choice: bearing and raising a child can be injurious to
a woman, and it is for her to evaluate the potential beneﬁts and burdens to her
of that pregnancy given her individual life circumstances and experiences, as
well as her personal valuation of them based on her values and interests.
In short, a negligently performed sterilization that results in an unwanted
pregnancy and birth of a child inﬂicts an “injury” because tort law deﬁnes
injury as “invasion[s] of any legally protected interest of another.”
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 7(I) (Am. Law Inst. 1965).
A woman’s autonomous right to decide whether or not to become pregnant
and have a child has been recognized as an interest legally protected by the
US Constitution for over thirty years.
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Defendant further argues that recognizing the Emersons’ claim would be
inconsistent with 10 R.I Gen. Laws § 7 1, which recognizes that the loss of a
viable fetus is a compensable wrong. In his brief, Magendantz asserts that to
“allow parents to claim that it is not the death or injury, but the birth of a child
that is a wrong amounts to a seemingly insurmountable paradox.” But it is no
paradox at all when one recognizes that on balance some pregnancies confer a
beneﬁt and some a burden according to a woman’s circumstances and values.
The reproductive rights cases are premised on that logic.
In essence, defendant’s reasoning that a child is always a blessing and a
beneﬁt would render a woman’s exercise of her constitutionally protected
right not to reproduce both illogical and invisible. We decline to ignore the
clear implication of the rights afforded women to make reproductive deci
sions: often, the birth of a child does inﬂict an injury, one of enough
signiﬁcance to overcome the government interests expressed in those cases.
Thus, a woman can have compelling and constitutionally protected reasons
for wanting to avoid pregnancy by obtaining a tubal ligation. The failure of the
medical procedure due to negligence inﬂicts a direct injury recognized in the
articulation of the constitutional right of reproductive autonomy, and this
right surely deserves recognition in the private law of torts. The interests
invaded by Dr. Magendantz’s malpractice have analogs across tort law, and
appreciation of the right invaded helps us to evaluate the second certiﬁed
question: how should damages for this cause of action be measured?

ii if so, what is the measure of damages?
Perhaps in anticipation of our decision to follow the overwhelming majority of
states that recognize a cause of action for pregnancy resulting from a failed
sterilization due to negligence, both parties focus their attention on the
measure of damages. As a general matter, a defendant physician is liable for
all foreseeable damages to a plaintiff patient for medical malpractice in the
provision of medical care. On the issue of compensable damages for this cause
of action, however, there is little consensus among other jurisdictions, yet the
distinctions they have entertained provide us with a range of alternatives for
answering this question. The larger set of jurisdictions allow for limited
recovery, while a smaller set of jurisdictions permit more expansive recovery.
Standard rules of proximate cause and foreseeability point toward recovery
for all categories of ordinary damages in a case where medical malpractice
leads to losses. Medical malpractice actions frequently include recovery for
medical expenses, pain and suffering, emotional distress, lost wages, and other
foreseeable economic harm. We use as a starting premise in determining what
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measure of damages should be permitted to a victim of medical malpractice
the same unquestioned basic common law rule of damages that we have
applied in all negligence cases for centuries. We have always permitted the
victim of a negligent tortfeasor to recover for all of the injuries and damages
that can be proven to have been reasonably foreseeable and proximately
caused by the tortfeasor's negligence. Atlantic Tubing & Rubber Co.
v. International Engraving Co., 528 F.2d 1272 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 817 (1976); Hueston v. Narragansett Tennis Club, Inc., 502 A.2d 827,
830 (R.I. 1986); Prue v. Goodrich Oil Co., 140 A. 665, 666 (R. I. 1928). See also
Restatement (Second) Torts § 917 (1979); 1 Minzer, Nates,
Kimball, Axelrod & Goldstein, Damages in Tort Actions,
chs. 1, 2 (1996); 4 Harper, James, & Gray, The Law of Torts, §§20.4,
20.5 at 130 39 (2d ed. 1986).
In the case of failed sterilization procedures, however, a majority of juris
dictions have departed from this rule. Only two states, New Mexico and
Wisconsin, follow traditional tort principles to permit the recovery of all
damages foreseeably and proximately caused by the negligent defendant.
Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 805 P.2d 603 (N.M. 1991); Marciniak
v. Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243 (Wisc. 1990). The most common position across
jurisdictions that recognize this cause of action is to allow recovery for a
limited set of damages, primarily for expenses related to the unwanted preg
nancy and birth of the child, but not including recovery for the costs of child
rearing.
Under the limited recovery rule, jurisdictions frequently grant compensa
tion to the plaintiffs for the medical expenses of the ineffective sterilization
procedure, for the medical and hospital costs of the pregnancy, for the expense
of a subsequent sterilization procedure, for loss of wages, and sometimes for
emotional distress arising out of the unwanted pregnancy and loss of consor
tium to the spouse arising out of the unwanted pregnancy. They also generally
include medical expenses for prenatal care, delivery, and postnatal care. In
other words, these damages are highly limited in time, focused on the events
surrounding the pregnancy and childbirth. The type of harm is not the
sticking point for these states, but rather continuing the damages paid through
out the child’s minority for ongoing expenses. We think that the length of time
that the plaintiffs will suffer economic harm is hardly a meaningful limitation.
If it is daunting for a court to imagine the awesome expenses associated with
raising a child to the age of majority, we are cognizant that these expenses are
in fact imposed on the plaintiff by the defendant’s negligence.
The reasons for limiting recovery vary. Some courts claim that calculating
the actual damage to parents requires an unacceptable level of speculation.
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For example, the Supreme Court of Washington in McKernan v. Aasheim,
687 P.2d 850 (Wash. 1984), has made some pertinent comments:
We believe that it is impossible to establish with reasonable certainty whether
the birth of a particular healthy, normal child damaged its parents. Perhaps
the costs of rearing and educating the child could be determined through use
of actuarial tables or similar economic information. But whether these costs
are outweighed by the emotional beneﬁts which will be conferred by that
child cannot be calculated. The child may turn out to be loving, obedient
and attentive, or hostile, unruly and callous. The child may grow up to be
President of the United States, or to be an infamous criminal. In short, it is
impossible to tell, at an early stage in the child's life, whether its parents have
sustained a net loss or net gain.
Id. at 8552

This court’s cautionary qualiﬁer that “perhaps” child rearing costs might be
able to be calculated is entirely unwarranted. Actuarial tables and economic
information about the costs of raising a child are readily available through
numerous federal and state agencies. The United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) has produced an annual report since 1960 on the expend
iture on children by families. The Bureau of Labor Statistics gathers consumer
expenditure statistics often used by state level child welfare agencies to set a
benchmark for child support. The costs of education are carefully tracked by
governmental education departments and accrediting agencies and ﬁnancial
institutions, and are routinely calculated when making investment and ﬁnan
cial aid determinations. When compared with pain and suffering damages,
emotional distress damages, or loss of consortium damages, the lifetime cost of
raising and educating a child is relatively easy to calculate. We are not
persuaded that this element of damage requires so much speculation that
we should depart from our ordinary practices.
As for the expressed concern about the speculative value to the parents of
the child’s accomplishments, the difﬁculty of commensurability pervades
remedies in tort law. See Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and
Commensurability, 43 Duke L.J. 56 86 (1993). For example, we allow
recovery for wrongful death, yet we know that no amount of money replaces
a loved one whose life is ended due to the negligence of another. When we
2

This argument assumes that a parent receives an economic beneﬁt, a “net gain,” from a child’s
accomplishment, such as becoming president of the United States. There was a time when the
legal status of the child included ownership of the child’s productivity, see, e.g., Viviana
Zelizer, Pricing the Priceless Child (1985), but the law of the family has developed
beyond that kind of calculation, as we discuss at greater length below.
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allow recovery for loss of consortium or for pain and suffering, we contemplate
substituting ﬁnancial payments under circumstances where we realize that
those payments are not direct equivalents to the loss at hand. Only a failure of
imagination lets us see the need for monetary damages for those losses, yet
prevents us from grasping the harms and ongoing economic costs associated
with a pregnancy by an individual who underwent surgery to prevent it.
Other jurisdictions explicitly depart from the normal proximate cause rules
in medical malpractice actions based on faulty sterilization for policy reasons
that aren’t always clearly articulated. In Johnson v. University Hospitals of
Cleveland, 540 N.E.2d 1370, 1377 (Ohio 1989), the Supreme Court of Ohio,
after considering rules adopted by the various states, suggested that it would
not mechanically apply the rules of proximate cause and foreseeability
because the “strict rules of tort should not be applied to an action to which
they are not suited, such as a wrongful pregnancy case, in which a doctor's
tortious conduct permits to occur the birth of a child rather than the causing
of an injury.” Id. at 1378. In Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 447 N.E.2d 385
(Ill. 1983), the Supreme Court of Illinois stated that they would not “rigidly
and unemotionally . . . apply the tort concept that a tortfeasor should be liable
for all of the costs he has brought upon the plaintiffs,” because, as Justice
Holmes famously stated, “the life of the law is not logic but experience,” and
their experience led them to conclude that it was more reasonable to deny
child rearing costs than to “abstractly apply[] a rule not suited for the circum
stances in this character of case.” Id. at 390.
We are unpersuaded that requiring a physician who commits malpractice
to pay for all foreseeable consequences of that malpractice demonstrates either
an emotional or an unusually rigid, strict, or abstractly formalistic response to
the circumstances of the case. We do agree, though, that the life of the law is
not based solely on logic, but also on experience. In our experience, a person
who seeks surgical intervention to avoid becoming pregnant has taken a
difﬁcult step consistent with her understanding, born of experience, that the
birth of a child would dramatically alter her life course, emotionally, socially,
and economically. When these signiﬁcant and foreseeable costs are imposed
on her as a result of medical malpractice, justice requires us to take notice.
While some courts consider the damages too speculative, and others argue
that they should be rejected for policy reasons grounded in experience or
reasonableness, most courts focus on the idea that the birth of a child
following an unwanted pregnancy confers an emotional beneﬁt of such value
that it washes away the costs of raising that child. Joy is in equipoise with
burden, nullifying losses associated with child rearing against choice. The
courts that take this approach do acknowledge that the costs of child rearing
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can be a compensable loss, but balance against these costs the beneﬁts derived
by the parents, either economic or emotional, from having a healthy child.
See, e.g., Univ. of Ariz. Health Sciences Centr. v. Superior Court of Ariz., 667
P.2d 1294 (Ariz. 1983); Ochs v. Borrelli, 445 A.2d 883 (Conn. 1982); Burke
v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1990). Ordinarily, these courts intuit that the
values are equal.
These courts refer to this offset as the “beneﬁt rule.” According to this rule,
when, in addition to inﬂicting an injury on a plaintiff, a defendant also
simultaneously confers a beneﬁt on that plaintiff, the beneﬁt should be
subtracted from the burden in the calculation of damages. This reasoning
would preclude granting rearing costs for a healthy child whose parents have
decided to forego the option of adoption and have decided to retain and raise
the child with all the joys and beneﬁts that presumably are derived from
parenthood. According to this reasoning, their decision to forego the option
of releasing the child for adoption constitutes persuasive evidence that the
parents consider the beneﬁt of retaining the child to outweigh the economic
costs of child rearing. See, e.g., Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So.2d 822 (Fla. 1984).
Courts that rely on this beneﬁt rule cite to the Restatement (Second)
Torts § 920 (Am. Law Inst.1979), which provides:
When the defendant’s tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to
his property and in so doing has conferred a special beneﬁt to the interest of
the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the beneﬁt conferred is considered
in mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is equitable.
[emphasis added]

These jurisdictions reason that this provision provides for full recovery for all
damages proximately resulting from a physician’s negligence, while also
permitting the factﬁnder to mitigate or reduce any damage award by what
may be proven to be the value of the beneﬁt conferred upon the plaintiff
parent or parents by the birth of the child. Yet the Restatement only
permits offsetting of damages by beneﬁts to the same interest of the plaintiff
that was harmed. That is to say, economic beneﬁts may be subtracted from
economic harms, emotional beneﬁts from emotional harms. The
Restatement does not support the offsetting of interests that are different
in type, such as the economic loss of child rearing costs offset with the
emotional gains of having a child. Comment b to Restatement § 920
makes this explicit, giving as examples that a court cannot offset economic
gain to reduce pain and suffering damages, nor can a court reduce damages
for loss of consortium because a spouse is no longer obligated to economically
support the lost loved one. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted in
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Marciniak, “[p]roperly applied in the negligent sterilization context, the ‘same
interest’ rule would require that the economic damages involved in raising the
child be offset by corresponding economic beneﬁts, and that emotional harms
be offset by emotional beneﬁts, and so on.” 450 N.W.2d at 249. See Joseph
S. Kashi, The Case of the Unwanted Blessing: Wrongful Life, 31 U. Miami
L. Rev. 1409, 1415 (1977). This court reasoned that the parents presumably
knew what emotional beneﬁts they were foregoing by not having a child, and
that it would be unfair "to not only force this beneﬁt upon them but to tell
them they must pay for it as well .” Id. The court also declined to offset
economic beneﬁts because it deemed any economic beneﬁts that a child
might bring to parents to be insigniﬁcant. Id.
This case illustrates the wisdom of the “same interest” limitation on the
“beneﬁt rule.” To the extent that raising a child confers the emotional beneﬁts
so hoped for by these courts, there is simply no way to take those emotional
beneﬁts to the bank when a wronged plaintiff seeks to house, clothe, feed, and
educate the child that results from defendant’s negligence. Even at the most
practical level, these jurisdictions ignore the reasons that the offset beneﬁts
must be limited to the same interests.
The “beneﬁt rule” is problematic for additional reasons, linked to our
answer to the ﬁrst certiﬁed question. Courts that rush past meaningful evalu
ation of why there must be a cause of action in these cases − because there is a
real harm to a fundamental constitutionally protected interest in reproductive
autonomy − fail to recognize that the exercise of the constitutionally protected
decision to avoid pregnancy is entirely routine in the experience of women.
A woman who chooses not to become pregnant believes that for her, in her
life circumstances, a child is a greater burden than beneﬁt. By focusing on the
beneﬁts of raising children, some courts appear to minimize the burdens of
caregiving, as if a labor of love is both priceless and costless. Caregivers know
otherwise. Not only does the care of children require enormous ﬁnancial
resources of parents, but it also exacts additional ﬁnancial opportunity costs,
impairing a parent’s earning capacity. Women’s earning capacity is particu
larly adversely impacted by having children. In addition, the emotional
content of caregiving is both joyful and burdensome, such that even the
nonﬁnancial aspects of parenting cannot be assumed to keep a parent “in
the black.” Attachment and responsibility exact pain and suffering on parents
just as they impart joy.
Courts that deploy soaring rhetoric to the effect that life’s greatest joys are
found in child rearing make a person’s decision not to have children, or
additional children, seem idiosyncratic or selﬁsh, as if it were an error from
which she was fortuitously rescued by the defendant’s malpractice. This belies

310

Emerson v. Magendantz

how ordinary it is for people to seek to prevent pregnancy. Day in and day out,
countless individuals, women in particular, go to great lengths to prevent
pregnancy, not out of a large scale miscalculation of beneﬁts and burdens,
but after a considered judgment about that balance. Although children can be
joyful, the sheer regularity of the choice to prevent pregnancy suggests that the
balance is often tilted toward burden. Those courts that invoke the “beneﬁt
rule” substitute their own feelings about children for the clearly revealed
preference of every patient who seeks sterilization procedures. This is senti
mentality, not justice.
Just as courts romanticize the beneﬁts of children in order to deny malprac
tice victims compensation for their costs, some courts also demean the value
of children with disabilities by recognizing that for them, unlike for a non
disabled child, a parent has been harmed by the imposition of an unwanted
pregnancy and can recover for lifelong expenses. For example, in Fassoulas
v. Ramey, supra, the Florida Supreme Court rejected child rearing costs for a
normal healthy child after a failed vasectomy, but observed that in the case of a
child with a physical or a mental disability, special medical and educational
expenses beyond normal rearing costs should be allowed because the “ﬁnan
cial and emotional drain associated with raising such a child is often over
whelming to the affected parents.” Fassoulas, 450 So. 2d at 824.
How quickly the Florida court turns from characterizing the birth of a child
as a blessing and a joy, to comprehending that raising a child can pose a
ﬁnancial and emotional drain that overwhelms affected parents. According to
the Florida court, a child with a disability is an injury, while a healthy child is
not. We reject this reasoning because it is a breathtaking double insult, both to
parents who derive tremendous joy from children with disabilities and to the
many parents of healthy children who ﬁnd that the ﬁnancial and emotional
strain of a healthy child is not worth the joys, and who therefore, like the
Emersons, seek to prevent the birth of future children.
Magendantz seeks to avoid even the costs of raising a child with a disability.
He urges that if we adopt the reasoning in Fassoulas, we should limit it by
holding that only where a physician is placed on notice, in performing a
sterilization procedure, that the parents have a reasonable expectation of
giving birth to a child with a physical or a mental disability, should the entire
cost of raising such a child be within the ambit of recoverable damages. While
Kirsten Emerson was born with a disability that increases the Emersons’
expenses compared with a healthy child, the Emersons were not motivated
by fear of disability when they sought sterilization. They were motivated by
economic concerns, feeling that they could not afford the ordinary child
rearing costs of a second child, whether perfectly healthy or not. By
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defendant’s logic, because the Emersons sought to avoid any expenses from
raising children, they should not be able to recover the greater expenses
associated with Kirsten’s disability, nor any of her ordinary child rearing
expenses.
Some courts have based their recovery rules on the reasons that a plaintiff
wished to avoid a pregnancy. For example, in Burke v. Rivo, the court held
that there is no harm when a patient seeks sterilization to avoid giving birth to
a child with a disability, and a failed sterilization leads to the birth of a healthy
child. The Massachusetts court allows recovery for child rearing costs of a
healthy child only if the plaintiff can show that she sought the sterilization for
ﬁnancial reasons. Ostensibly, this rule avoids paying child rearing expenses
where a patient might want to raise a child, but seeks to avoid pain and
complications from pregnancy and delivery. Burke, 551 N.E.2d at 5 6.
We think the search for motivations for a sterilization procedure cannot be
administered without inviting speculation or self serving testimony, or a dis
tasteful interrogation of patients prior to their seeking sterilization procedures.
Accordingly, we decline to structure an inquiry into the motivations for
preventing a pregnancy, just as we decline to base damages recovery on the
value placed on one child over another. Given how widespread and routine
the desire to prevent pregnancy is, we recognize that many individuals have
multiple overlapping reasons to prevent a pregnancy, and an effort to sort out
these reasons may unnecessarily stigmatize some reasons and pathologize this
routine choice. We instead choose to follow the holdings in both New Mexico
and Wisconsin, the two jurisdictions that follow traditional tort rules and allow
recovery for all foreseeable damages arising from malpractice in this context by
adopting a full recovery rule without offsetting either the economic or the
emotional beneﬁts to be derived from having a healthy child. Mendez, 805
P.2d at 611 15; Marciniak, 450 N.W.2d at 247 50.
Understanding the reasons for allowing the cause of action in the ﬁrst
instance aids in considering the appropriate measure of damages. Once we
appreciate that the beneﬁt theory can be characterized as ideological rather
than factual, in that it resists entirely the logic of exercising reproductive
freedom by choosing sterilization, we can set aside its strained application to
these cases and resort to the conventional rules of tort damages.
These cases have puzzled courts unnecessarily. One issue in particular,
raised in a number of courts, requires our comment. Some courts go about
assuming the beneﬁt of a child to a plaintiff by noting that the plaintiff had an
opportunity to either terminate her pregnancy or place her child for adoption.
The fact that she chose instead to raise her child, say these courts, proves that
the child is more beneﬁt than burden. See Univ. of Ariz. Health Sciences Ctr.,
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667 P.2d 1294; Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429 (Md. 1984); Sherlock
v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977).
Emerson sought sterilization to avoid being presented with either of these
options. She may have known she would not choose to terminate a pregnancy.
The right recognized in Roe v. Wade, and reafﬁrmed in Casey, is the right to
decide whether or not to terminate a pregnancy, and a woman should not be
penalized by tort law for whichever she decides to do. Emerson is already
parent to a child, and may not have wanted her child to experience the loss of
a sibling placed for adoption. This hardly negates the costs of raising Kirsten.
Emerson may have feared that given Kirsten’s disability, she would not ﬁnd
care as dedicated as the Emersons would provide. Emerson may have pre
dicted that despite the expenses of raising a child, she would experience an
emotional attachment that would make placing the child for adoption
impossible.
Courts who resist this cause of action also sometimes argue that it is a
dignitary harm to a child to have a parent litigate their birth as an injury.
Courts most often express this concern when the parents of a healthy child
seek damages; their corresponding silence when parents seek compensation
for an unwanted pregnancy that results in a child with a disability speaks
volumes about the value judgments being made about children with disabil
ities. This professed concern about the psychological impact of a lawsuit on
the child ignores the fact that the ﬁnancial costs of child rearing are real even
to a parent with tremendous attachment to a child, perhaps even because of
that attachment, which may fuel self sacriﬁce for which the Emersons did not
volunteer. As the court noted in Marciniak, the parents’:
suit is for costs of raising the child, not to rid themselves of an unwanted
child. They obviously want to keep the child. The love, affection, and
emotional support any child needs they are prepared to give. But the love,
affection and emotional support they are prepared to give do not bring with
them the economic means that are also necessary to feed, clothe, educate
and otherwise raise the child.
450 N.W.2d at 246

It would be unrealistic and callous to recharacterize the parents’ dilemma of
attachment as a beneﬁt pure and simple, much less a beneﬁt cancelling out
the extraordinary ﬁnancial burdens of child rearing. To do so would once
again resist the logic that drives the overwhelming majority of women to,
under some circumstances and for some period of time, seek out a variety of
means to avoid pregnancy and childbirth. Cognizance of that logic requires
that we fully compensate the Emersons for their damages.
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For these reasons, we answer the certiﬁed questions as follows:
1. When a physician negligently performs a sterilization and there is a
subsequent pregnancy and child, the patient has a cause of action for
medical malpractice.
2. The measure of damages is the same as in any other malpractice action,
and should include all foreseeable damages including the costs of
rearing the child to adulthood, regardless of whether the child is born
healthy or with a disability. Any emotional beneﬁts that the child brings
to the parents should not be offset against the economic costs of child
rearing.

